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Murder after the Merger: A Commentary 
on Finkelstein 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan† 
Critics have long sought the abolition of the felony 
murder rule, arguing that it is a form of strict liability.1 
Despite widespread criticism, the rule remains firmly 
entrenched in many states’ criminal statutes.2 In “Merger 
and Felony Murder,”3 Professor Claire Finkelstein reconciles 
herself to the current state of affairs, and seeks to make “an 
incremental improvement” to the doctrine. She offers a new 
test for felony murder’s merger limitation, which she 
believes will make merger less “mysterious” and its 
application “substantially clearer.”4 Briefly put, Finkelstein 
claims that to understand merger, we must recognize that it 
is an analytically necessary part of felony murder that the 
defendant commit two acts—a felony and a killing.5 Thus, a 
killing merges with the felony when we have only one act 
 
 †  Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law and 
Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law—Camden. An earlier version of 
this commentary was presented at the Special Part Conference at Louisiana State 
University Law School. I would like to thank the conference organizers, Antony 
Duff and Stuart Green, for inviting me to participate. I would also like to thank 
Doug Husak, Claire Finkelstein, Dennis Patterson, and Rick Singer for helpful 
suggestions, and Sunny Rubino for research assistance. 
 1. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of the American Felony Murder Rules, 57 
Stan. L. Rev. 59, 60 n.2 (2004) (citing commentators making this claim). Binder’s 
thorough historical analysis dispels the myth that our current felony murder 
statutes derive from an English common law rule that held felons strictly liable 
for unintended killings. See id. Of course, whatever felony murder’s historical 
origins, it is a separate question whether jurisdictions have remained faithful to 
felony murder’s original rationale or have expanded felony murder’s application 
to include strict liability. For example, California courts employ strict liability 
language. E.g., People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (“a 
felon is held strictly liable for All killings committed by him or his accomplices in 
the course of the felony”). 
 2. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 31.06 (3d ed. 2001). 
 3. Claire Finkelstein, Merger and Felony Murder, in Defining Crimes: 
Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law 218, 219 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. 
Green eds., 2005). 
 4. Id. at 220-21. 
 5. Id. at 229. 
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instead of two.6 To make this determination, Finkelstein 
articulates a “redescriptive” test that tells us when the 
felony can be redescribed as a killing.7 
Despite this project’s potential, I believe that 
Finkelstein’s proposed merger test, far from improving our 
understanding of merger, further confuses the doctrine. 
Finkelstein starts from the false conceptual premise that 
felony murder requires both a felony and a killing. There is 
simply no support for this claim. Nor does the promise of 
this project bear out in the application of Finkelstein’s test 
to actual cases. First, the test cannot be squared with two 
other limitations on felony murder liability. Second, 
Finkelstein’s test is guilty of the very arbitrary application 
for which she criticizes other tests. Finally, Finkelstein 
unsettles the law by turning paradigmatic cases on their 
heads. Finkelstein’s theory, while claiming to refine felony 
murder, ultimately abolishes the doctrine as we know it 
and replaces it with a doctrine that seems even more 
unacceptable. 
In what follows, I briefly explain the current 
limitations on the application of felony murder, including 
the merger doctrine, and set forth Finkelstein’s argument 
against current merger tests and her proposed 
“redescriptive” test for merger. I then demonstrate that 
Finkelstein’s initial claim about the structure of felony 
murder is unsupported, and that her test cannot be 
reconciled with other felony murder limitations, is 
arbitrary and ad hoc, and leads to counterintuitive results 
in paradigmatic cases. 
Nearly every state criminalizes felony murder, 
punishing, as murder, killings that result from the 
defendant’s commission of all, or at least some enumerated, 
felonies.8 To limit the broad reach of such provisions, many 
courts have engrafted restrictions onto these rules. The 
first common restriction is that the underlying felony has 
 
 6. Id. at 230. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Dressler, supra note 2, § 31.06[A]. 
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to be inherently dangerous.9 A second typical restriction is 
that the killing must be in furtherance of the felony, thus 
limiting liability when a felon is killed or when a police 
officer does the killing.10 
Finally, in some jurisdictions, there is no felony 
murder liability when the underlying felony merges.11 To 
explicate, if the defendant intentionally kills his victim, he 
must first point the gun at the victim to accomplish this 
feat. This action, assault with a deadly weapon, is itself a 
felony. If this crime could serve as the underlying felony for 
felony murder, the prosecution would never have to prove 
that the defendant intentionally killed the victim. Rather, 
the prosecutor could simply bootstrap from the assault 
charge to a felony murder charge. To prevent such a result, 
courts have held that some felonies merge into the 
homicidal act and cannot support felony murder liability. 
In Finkelstein’s view, the combination of the 
inherently dangerous test and the merger doctrine render 
felony murder ad hoc.12 When both rules are applied, we 
are reminded of “Goldilocks and the Three Bears”—felony 
murder liability seems to exist only in an odd middle 
ground in which the felony is sufficiently serious to be 
deemed inherently dangerous but is not too serious because 
intentional homicides merge.13 
To remedy this problem, Finkelstein focuses on the 
merger doctrine, for “[i]t is here that the felony murder rule 
encounters its greatest source of confusion, with results 
that sometimes border on incoherence.”14 She demonstrates 
the haphazard results brought about by California’s 
integral/included in fact and independent felonious purpose 
tests.15 These tests yield the asymmetric holdings that 
 
 9. See generally id. § 31.06[C][1]. 
 10. See generally id. § 31.06[C][4]. 
 11. See generally id. § 31.06[C][2]. 
 12. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 220 (“Not only do such results seem ad hoc, 
but it is hard even to imagine what a rationale for a doctrine with such wildly 
inconsistent outcomes could look like.”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 219. 
 15. People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1969); People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 
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active child abuse merges because the parent’s intention is 
to assault but passive child abuse—i.e., failure to provide 
food and water—does not merge because the parent does 
not intend any assault.16 Finkelstein also argues against 
Texas’s same act doctrine because courts lack “the crucial 
underlying concept of an ‘act’” rendering the theory 
inconsistent.17 Another approach, deference to legislative 
judgment, fails according to Finkelstein, because it leaves 
unanswered whether the legislature had considered the 
possibility of merger and also threatens to abolish felony 
murder, as every instance of strict liability felony murder 
undermines the legislative proscription that murder 
requires purpose, knowledge, or extreme indifference.18 
Finally, Finkelstein critiques jurisdictions that do not 
apply merger because they leave open the possibility that 
intentional killings, provoked killings, and reckless killings 
may all be treated as felony murders.19 
Finkelstein finds the root of the error to be 
functionalist reasoning, the view that felony murder is 
justified on deterrence grounds.20 Finkelstein claims that 
felony murder, rather than being an instrument of 
deterrence, is a descendant of the Catholic doctrine that 
one is responsible for “all the bad effects of his intentional 
wrongdoing.”21 The conclusion implicit in Finkelstein’s 
argument is this: because courts have constructed merger 
tests to serve deterrence rationales, such tests are doomed 
for failure. 
 
793, 801 (Cal. 1971). The inconsistencies resulting from these tests were, in fact, 
recognized by the California Supreme Court when it abandoned both tests in 
favor of a case-by-case approach. People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). 
 16. People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886 (Cal. 1984); People v. Shockley, 145 Cal. 
Rptr. 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 17. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 224. This was Texas’s test. Like California, 
the Texas court recognized the inconsistency of the results, and altered its test. 
Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (limiting the 
applicability of the same act test). 
 18. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 226. 
 19. Id. at 227. 
 20. Id. at 220, 229. 
 21. Id. 
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In Finkelstein’s view, the rationale for the merger 
doctrine is not functional—it is “structural.”22 According to 
Finkelstein, “it is an analytically necessary part of felony 
murder that there be, at a minimum, two separate things 
the defendant is doing: one that counts as a felony that is 
not a killing, and another that is a killing. Merger takes 
place when instead of two activities, we have only one.”23 
Merger thus turns on a determination of whether 
there is one act or two,24 and Finkelstein proposes the 
“redescriptive test” as the test of merger: 
[I]f the act in virtue of which the defendant satisfies the 
offense definition for the predicate felony can itself be 
redescribed in terms of the resulting death, we have only 
one act under two descriptions [and thus, there is merger]. 
If, on the other hand, the act cannot be redescribed in terms 
of the victim’s death, but the defendant did in fact cause the 
victim’s death by performing some act, then the act whereby 
the defendant satisfies the predicate felony and the act 
whereby he caused the victim’s death are separate [and 
thus, there is no merger].25 
To illustrate, if the defendant commits arson and 
inadvertently kills someone in the building, the act by 
which the defendant is guilty of arson is the same act as 
the act by which the defendant kills the victim, and the 
arson merges.26 
As Finkelstein recognizes, this redescriptive test runs 
into immediate difficulties. Under the Davidsonian account 
of action identity that she adopts, an action can always be 
redescribed in terms of its consequences.27 But then, the 
 
 22. Id. at 220. 
 23. Id. at 229. 
 24. Id. at 230. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 231. 
 27. Id. Finkelstein asserts that Davidson’s view is the “standard account,” id., 
and does not defend it against other theories of action identity. In contrast to 
Davidson, Alvin Goldman claims that flicking a light switch and turning on a 
light are not the same action. Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action 5 
(1970). Why? Because the relationship between the two is asymmetric and 
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merger exception swallows the felony murder rule. In every 
case where felony murder might be thought to apply, the 
death is certainly a consequence of the commission of the 
felony.28 To illustrate, Finkelstein presents a hypothetical 
case in which she decides to hold up a liquor store, points a 
gun at the cashier, and the gun accidentally discharges.29 
Because a consequence of “robbing the store” was “killing 
the cashier,” the redescriptive test yields that the felonious 
action can be redescribed as a killing; thus, the robbery 
merges. Such a result is problematic, according to 
Finkelstein, because “a killing during an armed robbery is 
the classic case of felony murder.”30 
To resolve this problem, Finkelstein amends 
Davidson’s test and argues that an action cannot be 
redescribed in terms of all of its consequences, at least 
insofar as we view the consequences of an action to be those 
things for which the action is a necessary antecedent 
(roughly, a but-for cause).31 While rejecting the concept of 
proximate causation in favor of the language of 
redescription,32 Finkelstein incorporates Hart and Honoré’s 
direct cause test into her theory of action identity.33 The 
result is that a predicate felony cannot be redescribed as a 
 
irreflexive. Id. That is, we cannot switch the order—I do not flick the switch by 
turning on the light (indicating an asymmetric causal relationship) and I do not 
turn on the light by turning on the light (thus it is irreflexive). Id. Hence, to 
Goldman, these items cannot be identical, and are therefore different actions. Of 
course, had Finkelstein adopted Goldman’s view, felonies would never merge 
because there would always be two actions. 
 28. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 231. 
 29. Id. at 232. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. She presents the following example: 
A stabs B, with the result that B is seriously wounded and must be rushed 
to the hospital. While in the hospital, C, a malicious interloper, disguises 
himself as a surgeon and intentionally operates badly on B, with the result 
that B dies. B’s dying is among the consequences of A’s stabbing B. But did 
A kill B? I do not think he did. 
Id. 
 32. Id. at 232-35 & n.40 (“it seems to me more helpful to speak of redescription 
than of causation”). 
 33. Id. at 235 n.40; see generally H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in 
the Law 68-83 (2d ed. 1985). 
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killing in those instances where Hart and Honoré would 
claim that a coincidence or a voluntary human actor 
intervened. 
Finkelstein next applies her test to a host of cases. 
Kidnapping typically will not merge because the act of 
unlawfully “removing a person from her home does not 
carry death with it as among the ordinary consequences of 
the act.”34 Moreover, when the kidnapper intentionally kills 
the victim, such a case will not merge because the 
defendant’s own voluntary act breaks the “redescriptive” 
chain.35 Both active and passive child abuse cases will 
merge because in both instances, the natural consequence 
is the death of the child.36 Finkelstein also claims that 
robberies and burglaries typically will not merge.37 
Finally, Finkelstein addresses two seemingly peculiar 
features of her test. First, arsons, contrary to previous 
treatment, will now merge, and secondly, the redescriptive 
test will give different answers to the same underlying 
felony depending upon the act by which the defendant 
satisfies the offense definition.38 Thus, a burglary 
perpetrated by breaking likely will not merge but a 
burglary perpetrated by remaining might.39 
I must say that I admire the order that Finkelstein 
attempts to bring to merger. Bringing clarity to doctrinal 
chaos is an admirable goal. Finkelstein’s project is all the 
more worthwhile because, rather than make another cry 
for abolition that will fall upon deaf ears, she hopes to 
practically, if only incrementally, improve a problematic 
doctrine. Unfortunately, I believe that Finkelstein’s project 
is misconceived from the inception and that a theory of 
action identity has little to tell us about merger or felony 
murder. 
 
 34. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 235. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 236. 
 37. Id. at 235-36. 
 38. Id. at 237-39. 
 39. Id. at 239. 
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Finkelstein’s entire test and its later application 
depend on her claim that it is an “analytically necessary” 
part of felony murder that there be both a felony and a 
killing.40 For this claim there is no support.41 Finkelstein’s 
move from the claim that felony murder is a descendant of 
the Catholic doctrine that one is responsible for all the bad 
effects of one’s wrongful action to the claim that felony 
murder requires two separate actions is a non sequitur.42 
Indeed, if anything, Finkelstein’s discussion of felony 
murder’s ancestry seems to point in just the opposite 
direction. Why is it that felony murder requires two 
separate acts, as opposed to one wrongful act with bad 
effects? Finkelstein provides no argument. There is simply 
no reason to believe that felony murder requires both a 
felony and a killing. 
Additionally, Guyora Binder’s extensive study of felony 
murder rules does not support Finkelstein’s claim. After 
examining the origins of felony murder statutes as they 
were promulgated in individual states, Binder’s assessment 
is that “felony murder liability has no single rationale or 
function, no necessary form or scope.”43 Thus, the various 
and disparate uses of felony murder liability in individual 
states belie Finkelstein’s broad generalization about the 
necessary structure of felony murder. 
Even though the grounds for Finkelstein’s 
redescriptive test are dubious, we may nevertheless wish to 
consider whether it is effective. Does it make merger less 
“mysterious” and “substantially clearer?”44 I am afraid it 
does not. 
 
 40. Id. at 229. 
 41. In Garrett v. State, the Texas court faced the question of whether an 
aggravated assault could support felony murder. 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1978). The court noted that allowing this sort of bootstrapping would undermine 
the legislative intent, and thus, set forth a “same act” test. Id. at 546. In 
articulating this test, the court engaged in functional, not structural, analysis, 
and thus, the case provides no support for Finkelstein’s claim. Notably, the same 
act test has now been limited in Texas to the specific crime at issue in Garrett. 
Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 
 42. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 229. 
 43. Binder, supra note 1, at 203. 
 44. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 220-21. 
FERZANMACRO.DOC 3/8/2006 9:05 AM 
2006] MURDER AFTER THE MERGER 569 
One significant difficulty is that Finkelstein’s merger 
test cannot be squared with two other limitations on felony 
murder—that the felony must be inherently dangerous and 
that the killing must be in furtherance of the felony. 
Finkelstein’s test ultimately eviscerates both of these 
limitations. Consider the marriage of Finkelstein’s merger 
test with the inherently dangerous felony limitation. 
Finkelstein claims that “we can entirely dispense with the 
inherently dangerous requirement” once we apply her merger 
test.45 Not only can we dispense this requirement, we have 
to. There is just about nothing left of felony murder after we 
restrict felony murder to those felonies that foreseeably risk 
death but find merger whenever the felony may be 
redescribed as a killing. If the death is foreseeable (and thus 
inherently dangerous) then it is should also merge, because 
such a foreseeable death is unlikely to be a coincidence 
under Hart and Honoré’s test, which requires, inter alia, 
that the event be statistically unlikely and that the second 
event (the putative coincidence) be independent of the 
defendant’s conduct.46 Combining the tests, it seems that 
only bizarre cases would not merge: a death must be 
foreseeable but the causal route by which this particular 
death occurs must be deviant. Hence, felony murder is 
almost nonsensical if we both apply Finkelstein’s 
redescriptive test and require that the felony be inherently 
dangerous.47 Thus, to preserve Finkelstein’s merger test, we 
 
 45. Id. at 237 (emphasis added). 
 46. See People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989) (defining inherently 
dangerous as requiring that the offense carry a “high probability” that death will 
result); Hart & Honoré, supra note 33, at 78 (setting forth the requirements for a 
coincidence that breaks the causal chain). 
 47. The only alternative to this result is to view felony murder provisions as a 
way of grading murders. That is, murders that occur within the course of a felony 
are first-degree murders. The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted its felony 
murder statute in this manner, and found that the statute abrogated the common 
law felony murder rule, which held defendants strict liable for deaths that 
occurred during the course of a felony. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 
1980). But given that the California Supreme Court ultimately rejected such a 
reading of its identical statute, one cannot say that felony murder must as a 
matter of analytical necessity be a grading mechanism. See People v. Dillon, 668 
P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983). What prevents California from choosing to punish 
unintentional killings during the course of a felony as murder? 
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must dispense with the inherently dangerous limitation—a 
result that Finkelstein both recognizes and endorses. 
The question is whether Finkelstein should count 
among the arguments for her position that her test 
eviscerates the inherently dangerous felony requirement. 
Or, why is it that “the imposition of an inherently 
dangerous requirement tends to get matters backwards”?48 
It seems perfectly legitimate for jurisdictions to limit the 
application of the felony murder rule to those felonies, like 
rape and robbery, which are inherently dangerous. Indeed, 
Guyora Binder’s extensive study of the history of felony 
murder tells us that felony murder, rather than having the 
broad, strict liability application previously supposed, was 
often limited to specific enumerated felonies where the 
commission of such felonies demonstrated recklessness.49 
Yet, Finkelstein’s rule renders the commission of many 
inherently dangerous felonies, especially those that 
demonstrate recklessness, as ineligible for felony murder 
under a merger theory. Why is this the preferable result? 
Another problem with Finkelstein’s merger test is how it 
awkwardly incorporates the “in furtherance” requirement. If 
a police officer intervenes in the robbery, shoots at the 
defendant, but misses and kills the victim, is this an instance 
of felony murder? This is now a merger problem under 
Finkelstein’s analysis. To analyze this problem under Hart 
and Honoré’s test, we might say the police officer’s actions 
were not voluntary, as they were done out of necessity, and 
they were not coincidental. Thus, there is no break in the 
causal/redescriptive chain, and the police officer’s shooting of 
the victim qualifies as an action by the defendant. Thus, 
according to Finkelstein, there should be merger and no 
felony murder liability. This result, of course, is directly 
contrary to the “proximate cause” test adopted by a minority 
of jurisdictions where it is the very fact that the police officer’s 
behavior was proximately caused by the defendant that 
renders the defendant liable for felony murder.50 
 
 48. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 237. 
 49. Binder, supra note 1, at 207. 
 50. See Dressler, supra note 2, § 31.06[C][4][c]. 
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More troubling still is squaring this result with the 
majority rule—the agency approach, which holds that a 
defendant is not liable for acts of non-felons.51 While both 
Finkelstein’s merger test and the agency test hold that 
felons are not responsible for the acts of third parties, the 
theories behind the tests are diametrically opposed. 
Finkelstein’s test yields that because the “redescriptive 
chain” between the felon’s action and the ultimate killing of 
the victim is not broken by the police officer, the police 
officer’s action is the defendant’s action. This is antithetical 
to the agency approach’s rationale, which claims that the 
police officer is not the felon’s agent, and thus the felon is 
not responsible for the police officer’s actions. 
At this point, Finkelstein is asking us to take much on 
faith. She offers no underlying rationale for her test, and 
now, we must accept her test not only for merger but also 
as the only significant limitation applicable to felony 
murder. The burden now is extremely high for Finkelstein. 
We should expect that Finkelstein’s test makes 
incremental progress (at the very least), and gives us a 
more coherent approach to merger. It does not. 
First, Finkelstein’s test is just as arbitrary and ad hoc 
as the tests that Finkelstein criticizes. Finkelstein’s test 
ultimately includes only those cases where the defendant 
commits a felony and then commits a second voluntary act. 
So, if a rapist continuously presses his hand against the 
victim’s throat, thereby satisfying the force requirement for 
rape while simultaneously killing the victim, he will not be 
guilty of felony murder. There is only one act. But if this 
same rapist stops for a moment to scratch his nose and 
then reapplies force that kills the victim, then there is 
felony murder liability. I see no principled rationale for 
such a distinction. 
Finkelstein partially responds to this complaint when 
she discusses what she terms the “‘double assault’” case—
e.g., two punches in the nose where the second one results 
 
 51. See id. § 31.06[C][4][b]. 
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in death,52 but her solution is ad hoc. She states, “[w]here 
there are two acts of the defendant’s of the same type, 
followed in quick succession by one another, we should 
regard the defendant as engaged in a single activity and 
treat the merger requirement for felony murder as not [sic] 
met.”53 Finkelstein leaves wholly unexplained the range of 
cases to which her rule applies or what grounds this 
amendment to action identity theory. This is simply an ad 
hoc attempt to deal with a counterintuitive aspect of her 
proposal. 
Second, Finkelstein’s test leads to counterintuitive 
results in paradigmatic cases. Consider armed robbery. 
Returning to Finkelstein’s liquor store robbery (wherein 
she points the gun at the cashier and the gun accidentally 
discharges), she claims that this robbery does not merge 
“because it is only in an attenuated sense that my threat 
causes the death of clerk.”54 Why? Robbery requires the 
threat of serious bodily injury,55 and pointing a gun at 
someone constitutes reckless endangerment.56 Given that 
Finkelstein views arson as merging because “setting a 
building or a truck on fire is a highly dangerous activity, 
one that may very well lead to a loss of human life in the 
ordinary course of events,”57 it seems that this case of 
robbery should also merge. Yet, as Finkelstein herself 
claims, armed robberies of this type are classic cases of 
felony murder.58 
Now, consider a second typical felony murder case. 
Imagine that the cashier sees the gun and dies of a heart 
attack.59 Under Finkelstein’s analysis, this case cannot 
 
 52. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 239. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 235. 
 55. Model Penal Code § 221.1(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 56. Id. § 211.2. 
 57. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 238. 
 58. Id. at 232. 
 59. Original application of the felony murder rule did not include heart attack 
cases. Binder, supra note 1, at 196. However, current courts do apply felony 
murder rules in these situations. People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1969); State v. Dixon, 387 N.W.2d 682 (Neb. 1986). 
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support felony murder liability. First, it seems likely that 
this case should merge because pointing the gun should be 
redescribed as the killing. Such a situation is quite 
frightening, and thus, a victim having a heart attack is 
hardly coincidental. Second, even if this case does not 
merge, we now have a second problem. We still do not know 
if this is a case of felony murder. For felony murder, we 
need two things according to Finkelstein: an act that is the 
felony and an act that is the killing. That is, Finkelstein 
has given us a new requirement for felony murder. Not 
only must we look to see if the defendant’s conduct can be 
redescribed as a killing, but if it cannot, we still need a 
second act—a killing—by the defendant. In the heart 
attack case, however, there is no second act. The defendant 
points the gun, it scares the victim, and the victim dies. So, 
if pointing the gun is the killing, there is merger, but if 
pointing the gun is not the killing, then no one kills the 
cashier because there is not a second voluntary act by the 
defendant that can be described as a killing. 
Finally, let us apply Finkelstein’s test to what has 
always been viewed as the definitive case for merger: 
provoked killings, e.g., those cases that are mitigated from 
murder to manslaughter because reasonable provocation 
led the defendant to kill the victim. Notably, Finkelstein 
criticizes jurisdictions that do not have a merger rule 
because, among other reasons, they “eliminate any 
opportunity for defendants to claim provocation.”60 So, we 
should expect to find merger under Finkelstein’s test in 
provocation cases. 
Let us assume that the defendant, having witnessed 
the victim horribly attack her child (but without any ability 
to intervene), follows the victim home, breaks into his 
house, pulls a gun, and shoots the victim. First, we might 
consider burglary as the predicate felony. Here, Finkelstein 
tell us the answer: this type of burglary will not merge: 
“entering a dwelling, even when the purpose is to bring 
about a later killing, cannot itself be redescribed as 
 
 60. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 227. 
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killing. . . . [because] the defendant’s own later voluntary 
act (of attacking, assaulting, or killing) breaks the 
redescriptive chain from entering a dwelling to the victim’s 
death.”61 So, the provoked killer who commits a burglary in 
order to commit her killing can be guilty of felony murder. 
Let us tighten the hypothetical a bit then. Forget the 
burglary. After the defendant witnesses a reasonably 
provoking event, the defendant simply points a gun at the 
victim and then fires. I submit that under Finkelstein’s 
burglary analysis, there is still no merger in this case. 
Why? Let us assume that the predicate felony is assault 
with a deadly weapon. Now, it certainly seems likely that 
death will result here. But as Finkelstein notes, voluntary 
human actors break the chain, including voluntary human 
actions by the defendant.62 Thus, pointing the gun and 
threatening the victim with the gun—those actions that 
satisfy the offense definition for assault with a deadly 
weapon—do not proximately cause the victim’s death. 
Rather, the defendant’s later voluntary action of “pulling 
the trigger” causes the death. Thus, assault with a deadly 
weapon fails the redescriptive merger test, the defendant’s 
pulling the trigger was a second act of killing, and provoked 
killings support felony murder liability. 
I find these results wildly implausible. From armed 
robberies to heart attack cases to instances of voluntary 
manslaughter, we are left with a felony murder rule that 
does not seem to capture what this admittedly confused 
doctrine should. 
In summary, Finkelstein does not present a viable 
alternative to current merger tests. Finkelstein’s claim—
that felony murder requires both a felony and a killing—is 
false, and thus, her test, which rests upon this premise, 
fails. Felony murder, after Finkelstein’s merger, is even 
more incoherent and arbitrary than it was before. We are 
left without the inherently dangerous and in furtherance 
limitations, in a world where armed robberies merge but 
 
 61. Id. at 236. 
 62. Id. at 235. 
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provoked killings do not. Our current regime may resemble 
that of Goldilocks, but Finkelstein asks us to venture into 
Wonderland. I suggest we decline her invitation. 
